

CASE 1:07-CV-00616-MHT-SRW

Roger Reeves,
Plaintiff,
v.

RECEIVED

2008 APR -7 A 10:39

LEBRA P. HACKETT, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT ALA

DSI Security Services, et al,

Defendants,

Plaintiff Roger Reeves
Answer to Defendant DSI Motion
for Summary Judgment

First of all my claim against DSI is one
of Race, Religion, Wages (based of Race and Religion)
and Hostile Work Environment. Plaintiff has asserted
claim of hostile work environment per EEOC charge file.
Plaintiff asserted that in at least two statement by intake
person. ("Member of management made a statement to another
employee about PCP's religion" and "Supr. made negative
statements about a white female who was married to a Black").

These statement shows more than an inference to a Hostile Work Environment. These are the only ones showed on EEOC Charge File. The instate person was very reluctant to take information about racial acts when given to her. (see document 1)

Plaintiff has allege and shown or can show that DSI did not allow plaintiff to have Weds. off for Church and gave Wednesdays off to a White Employee(Religious). Also it can be shown that a white person was given more hours than the Plaintiff (Overtime Hours) ^{and they} did not rotate overtime hours. Defendant is not truthful when he said that there has never been ANY religious or racial discrimination against the Plaintiff. Plaintiff is providing a document showing that DSI knew that he had religious preference. I was taking Friday's off for church with DSI and another Security Guard knowledge. (Document 2). DSI knew I had a religious preference from the beginning of my employment because I asked for Sunday's off. DSI has

Shown a tendency to not be truthful in this matter

They have submitted to the Court and to the EEOC "Sworn"

Document stating that they did not have "ANY Knowledge" I
had Any Religious Preference. They have been awarded in

error Summary Judgement on Pay Claim base on a Fraud

in EEOC and the Court. When someone is Caught
cheating or lying we can only assume that it is an acknowledgement
ment of his guilt. He should not be allowed to commit

Perjury and be awarded Summary Judgement. When someone
lies about a matter such as this we can only conclude that
a hostile environment is present. (see Document 3) (PARAGRAPh 1, 2)

The "particulars" ARE ANSWERS Submitted back to EEOC
from an Inquiry No. 420-2006-83907W. They are answers to
Question submitted and NOT to my charge given they were
gleaned from Questions submitted to me.

(4) The reason mediation did not work was because my civil rights were violated when DSI left the room with Mr James Lee the ADR Coordinator. They created a hostile environment away from the Job thereby creating a hostile environment on the Job.

(5) The second mediation was fraught with Fred and Mrs Debra Lee came after saying she would not come and said she would send someone from her Montgomery office. I have learned that there is not any ADR Montgomery Office. She was not truthful and showed while she was there that she was in league with DSI. (SEE ALSO Recommendation to Magistrate Judge Report for DSI)

(1)

Legal Standards

According to law DSI is discriminatory in hours given, Religion, and walking out of EEOC ADR meeting w/ the ADR person and Pejury and thereby has created a very hostile work environment.

(2) EEOC told me that Papers were served on American Building and when I asked why they were removed from the charge the EEOC "Yelled" and "Screamed" more than once

that they were not my Employer after I told her that they were my Employer as much as DSI was.

(3) The environment at American is so Hostile that the person that told me about the mixed Couple said that if he was call to testify he would not because he feared he would lose his job. He said he had seen it happened with Employees trying to start a Union. The other has shown more fear and intimidation than he has. American has shown an insulting attitude when they sent a person from the factory out to inspect the mopped floor and I was reiterate when Person with the same First Name as mine did. Other Acts:

- (1) Employees allowed to wear Confederate Flags (swed on clothes) (American)
see Document 8
- (2) Not answering CB when Black Person call until third or fourth time (American Management (PLANT))
- (3) White Workers not coming Out when call for Emergency at home (American Management) (see Document 6 par. 2)
- (4) DSI Allowing Employees to Drive with Confederate License Plates (DSI Management)
- (5) Having next now hire take Sunday off on his first Day and having Plaintiff work on Sunday when there was a Disinfect PAVANT management

- (7) DS1 showing retaliatory action by having
Mother of 5 work Double Shift over
Thanksgiving. (ALAN WOOD)
- (8) Management Not taking Plaintiff and
his BIBLE (AMERICAN)
- (9) DS1 preference in Hiring (ALAN WOOD)
- (10) Lying about length of Contracts (ALAN WOOD; Secretary)
(SEE Document 5) (HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT)
- (11) DS1 + AMERICAN (NOT Giving Promise Raise) (ALAN WOOD) (AMERICAN;
JOHN HOWARD)
- (12) AMERICAN asking for Delmar Jones to Work
over BLACK PERSON. (JOHN HOWARD, ALAN WOOD)
- (13) DS1 intimidate into providing Review of
accident that happened on Job. I had to Drive
to Dothan Because AMERICAN required it. I
was forced to Drive to Dothan. (HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT)
- (14) Comment about previous Black Religious
Employee (Derogatory; SEE Document 7 - PARAGRAPH 2)
- (15) Not Giving Promised Raise after Stating
they were going to Sign Paperwork on
Memorial Day Weekend.

By committing these act DSI and American has created a hostile work environment (SEE Document 4).

I don't think American should be allowed to change their position. I think an estoppel should be granted. (SEE Document 3 paragraph 3).

To defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided for in this rule (56(c)), must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial".

Plaintiff has shown with irrefutable evidence that there is a genuine issue for trial. Plaintiff has shown that Defendant DSI has shown a blatant disregard for the truth and rights of the Plaintiff. Defendant has shown Defendant has lied about Contract length and can we believe his salary record? He has been untruthful in Sworn Statement about Plaintiff religion. Facts has been presented in this document and Reply to Magistrate Judge Report for DSI to refute their lies.

Plaintiff has shown that Plaintiff inferred a hostile environment through statements with EEOC

Plaintiff has also provided documents showing the
The Confederate FLAG "X" creates a hostile environment along
with other ACTS (ridicule, insult, discriminatory intimidation) that
is sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect the conditions of the
Victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.

Against my claims is one of Race, Religion, PAY, disparity in
Pay. The Court or EEOC has interpreted their facts from
information not given. It is obvious to Plaintiff that
a hostile environment is most reasonably to grow out of
a Race and Religious claim given the fact stated. Plaintiff
was trying to prove a disparity pay claim for Guards at
American Building and his self. I was not allowed discovery
to prove my case. Defendant has shown he would not
allow religious days to be changed, more hours to white
employee, hiring, worker not having Qualification. I think
Defendant has problem with Plaintiff at American (^{AND}) their
Workers. Document shows OSI untruthful about the
length of the Contract Plaintiff should be given
Case as a matter of law. Summary judgement
Should not be granted to Defendant. (See "Answer
to Magistrate Judge Report for OSI and American")

I swear under Penalty of Perjury
that the afore information is correct to the
best of my knowledge.

Roger Beers
4/4/08

Signed this 4th

April, 2008.

Karen Clegg

Clerk Capp - 3-26-10

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on this day the foregoing Plaintiff Roger Reeves served on the following the above documents via U.S. Mail, first class postage attached to ensure delivery:

Danielle J. Hylot
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
1801 L ST. NW
Washington, D.C. 20507

Nelson Mullins
& Riley Scarborough LLP
Attorneys and Counselors
AT LAW
Atlantic Station
201 17th Street NW
Suite 1700, Atlanta, GA.
30363

David T. Wiley
Jackson Lewis LLP
Park Place Tower Suite 650
2001 Park Place North
BIRMINGHAM AL. 35203

Document 1

Roger Reeves 091806 Intake Notes

PCP immediate super John Howard

PCP was the only employee promised a wage increase.
No mgmt personnel had ever said anything directed to PCP about his religion.

{ A member of mgmt made a statement to another employee about PCP's religion }

PCP believes this member of mgmt would play a role in PCP receiving a wage increase.

Allen Wood - Super
religion - not known

John Howard - Personnel Coordinator
religion - not known

of Security Guards - 4 including PCP

PCP is the only member of his faith

PCP not aware of the religion of the others

Race, Religion

At the present time all guards are Blacks
PCP is not present when the other Blacks were at work.

{ Super type made negative comments about a White female who was married to a Black }

PCP not given a reason in June for the denial of a raise.

Document 2

I Tiffinia Flowers swear under
Penalty of Perjury that Roger Reeves
and I was exchanging hours on Fridays
so he could go to Church.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ Employee Tiffinia Flowers (SSI Employee)



EMPLOYEE SIGN-IN SHEETS

Week Ending*: _____

Client Location: _____

Page ____ of ____ Sheets.

DATE	NAME (Print)	SIGNATURE	TIME** IN	OUT	TOTAL HRS.	SUPERVISOR
13-28-08	Emma Lawrence	Emma Lawrence	0400	0600	6	
28-28-08	Roger Reeves	Roger Reeves	1400	2200	8	
32-28-08	Sheronda Lester	Sheronda Lester	0200	2400	2	
32-29-08	Sheronda Lester	Sheronda Lester	0000	0600	6	
5-29-08	Roger Reeves	Roger Reeves	1400	2400	10	
6-3-08	Roger Reeves	Roger Reeves	0000	0600	6	
7-3-08	Tiffinea Flowers	Tiffinea Flowers	0000	1800	12	
8-3-08	Sheronda Lester	Sheronda Lester	1800	2400	6	
9-3-08	Sheronda Lester	Sheronda Lester	0000	0600	6	
10-3-08	Tiffinea Flowers	Tiffinea Flowers	0000	1800	12	
11-3-08	Sheronda Lester	Sheronda Lester	1800	2400	6	
12-3-08	Sheronda Lester	Sheronda Lester	0000	0600	6	
13-3-08	Roger Reeves	Roger Reeves	1400	2200	8	
14-3-08	Emma Lawrence	Emma Lawrence	2200	0600	8	
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						
25						
26						
27						
28						

*ALWAYS A WEDNESDAY

**USE MILITARY TIME ONLY

TOTAL
HOURS

Document 2

Untitled

overturning a judgement. The court in Sutter v. Easterly (Mo) 189 SW2d 284, articulated the general rule defining fraud on the court within the courts of Missouri:

"... where a lawyer engages in a conspiracy to commit a fraud upon the court by the production of fabricated evidence and by such means obtains a judgement then the enforcement of the judgement becomes manifestly unconscionable' and a court of equity may devitalize the judgement." Id, at 288.

In State of Missouri, v. Robert Joe Mason, 394 S.W.2d 343, and many other similar cases, it is accepted that if a party is caught cheating, that it can be inferred that their cause is an unrighteous one and that their conduct is evidence of their guilt.

equitable estoppel

: an estoppel that prevents a person from adopting a new position that contradicts a previous position maintained by words, silence, or actions when allowing the new position to be adopted would unfairly harm another person who has relied on the previous position to his or her loss called also estoppel in pais

NOTE: Traditionally equitable estoppel required that the original position was a misrepresentation which was being denied in the new position. Some jurisdictions retain the requirement of misrepresentation.

promissory estoppel

: an estoppel that prevents a promisor from denying the existence of a promise when the promisee reasonably and foreseeably relies on the promise and to his or her loss acts or fails to act and suffers an injustice that can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise

Document 4

Untitled

a) "Hostile Environment" Violates Title VII - The Court rejected the employer's contention that Title VII prohibits only discrimination that causes "economic" or "tangible" injury: "Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" whether based on sex, race, religion, or national origin. 106 S. Ct. at 2405. Relying on the EEOC's Guidelines' definition of harassment, the Court held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII "by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Id. The Court quoted the Eleventh Circuit's decision in *Henson v. City of Dundee*, 682 F.2d 897, 902, 29 EPD ¶ 32,993 (11th Cir. 1982):

<http://www.eeonews.com/news/race/index.html>

Charged at American Bridges. for DSI

John Howard is plant manager (Presently Manager)
as stated in Charge File to Court

Document 5

I Paul Forehand under the
Penalty of Perjury states that
Alfred Wood and DSI said that they had a
three year Contract with American Building
that would be evaluate at the end of three years.
DSI made that statement in the year 2002. (1)

Roger Rees

3/6/2008

(1) Former Employee Paul Forehand(wh.t.c).

Document 6

Untitled

18. The definition also does not require that the speech take place in the workplace; even speech outside the workplace can be considered if it creates a hostile environment at work. See Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1992) (relying in part on a coworker "telephoning [Intlekofer] at her home" to support a hostile environment claim); Bersie v. Zycad Corp., 399 N.W.2d 141, 143, 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (relying in part on a coworker "calling [Bersie] at home" to conclude that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of harassment, expressly applying Vinson); cf. Bartlett v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1246, 1262 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (finding that two instances of sexually suggestive conduct, including "[p]laintiff receiv[ing] a sexually explicit card at her home from a coworker," did not rise to the level of sexual harassment, but not even hinting that the card was somehow categorically disqualified because it was received outside the workplace); Myer-Dupuis v. Thomson Newspapers, No. 2:95-CV-133 (W.D. Mich. May 9, 1996), reported in Mich. Law. Wkly., May 27, 1996, at 12A. These cases are eminently consistent with the harassment definition given by the Supreme Court: It's quite plausible that speech by coworkers outside the workplace may create a hostile environment within the workplace.

55. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2nd Cir. 1997). See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1986) ("The perception that the work environment is hostile can be influenced by the treatment of other persons of a plaintiff's protected class, even if that treatment is learned second-hand."); Dortz v. City of New York, 904 F. Supp. 127, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("offensive statements made . . . outside of Plaintiff's presence, may also be viewed by a factfinder as having contributed to creating a hostile environment"); Barbutta v. Chelawn Services Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990):

[Without prejudice means you can bring the claim again. This makes sense if you think logically. Rule 41 assumes that if there is a dismissal *against* a plaintiff's wishes, it is presumed to be on the merits, but if it's the plaintiff himself who wants to drop it, the dismissal is voluntary and not on the merits (without prejudice). The parties or the judge can say otherwise, and in this case, IBM has, agreeing to drop the counterclaims *with* prejudice, so this is the end of those claims. Aside from the money issue, not wanting to risk having to pay SCO's legal bills, this indicates that IBM really doesn't want to be bothered with patent counterclaims in this case. It is possible that SCO wouldn't sign the agreement unless it was "with prejudice" but my guess is IBM doesn't care anyway, because they don't need them and don't have any intention of using them now. It was IBM's idea to drop them. You don't use nukes against a flea.]



Document 17

Untitled

18. The definition also does not require that the speech take place in the workplace; even speech outside the workplace can be considered if it creates a hostile environment at work. See Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1992) (relying in part on a coworker "telephoning [Intlekofer] at her home" to support a hostile environment claim); Bersie v. Zycad Corp., 399 N.W.2d 141, 143, 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (relying in part on a coworker "calling [Bersie] at home" to conclude that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of harassment, expressly applying Vinson); cf. Bartlett v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1246, 1262 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (finding that two instances of sexually suggestive conduct, including "[p]laintiff receiv[ing] a sexually explicit card at her home from a coworker," did not rise to the level of sexual harassment, but not even hinting that the card was somehow categorically disqualified because it was received outside the workplace); Myer-Dupuis v. Thomson Newspapers, No. 2:95-cv-133 (W.D. Mich. May 9, 1996), reported in Mich. Law. Wkly., May 27, 1996, at 12A. These cases are eminently consistent with the harassment definition given by the Supreme Court: It's quite plausible that speech by coworkers outside the workplace may create a hostile environment within the workplace.

55. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2nd Cir. 1997). See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1986) ("The perception that the work environment is hostile can be influenced by the treatment of other persons of a plaintiff's protected class, even if that treatment is learned second-hand."); Dorts v. City of New York, 904 F. Supp. 127, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("offensive statements made . . . outside of Plaintiff's presence, may also be viewed by a factfinder as having contributed to creating a hostile environment"); Barbutta v. Chelawn Services Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990):

[Without prejudice means you can bring the claim again. This makes sense if you think logically. Rule 41 assumes that if there is a dismissal *against* a plaintiff's wishes, it is presumed to be on the merits, but if it's the plaintiff himself who wants to drop it, the dismissal is voluntary and not on the merits (without prejudice). The parties or the judge can say otherwise, and in this case, IBM has, agreeing to drop the counterclaims *with* prejudice, so this is the end of those claims. Aside from the money issue, not wanting to risk having to pay SCO's legal bills, this indicates that IBM really doesn't want to be bothered with patent counterclaims in this case. It is possible that SCO wouldn't sign the agreement unless it was "with prejudice" but my guess is IBM doesn't care anyway, because they don't need them and don't have any intention of using them now. It was IBM's idea to drop them. You don't use nukes against a flea.]



DOCUMENTS

Untitled

An employee who was fired in retaliation for reporting wage and benefit improprieties is entitled to recover punitive damages under the FLSA. A federal court in Pennsylvania interpreted the phrase "legal or equitable relief" under the anti-retaliatory provision of the FLSA to include punitive damages. Marrow v. Allstate Security & Investigative Services Inc. The court reasoned that deterring employers from punishing workers who exercise FLSA rights by allowing punitive damages helps effectuate the purposes of the law.

LOSS AT ARBITRATION DOES NOT MEAN EMPLOYEE IS PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING TITLE VII CASE IN FEDERAL COURT

However, an adverse decision by a neutral is highly probative. The employee must present new evidence or challenge the neutrality of the arbitrator.

A mechanic refused to remove a Confederate flag sticker from his toolbox after an African-American co-worker complained that the sticker was offensive. The mechanic's claim of free speech was denied.

(Dixon v. Colourg Dairy Inc., 4th Cir.)

→ Morel v. American Bldg. Co. 2nd Circuit

ECONOMICS.COM

Document 8

Untitled

20. Cf. West v. Derby Unified School Dist. No. 260, 2000 WL 294093 (10th Cir. Mar. 21) (upholding school "racial harassment policy" that defined as harassing "clothing, articles, material, publications or any item that denotes Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nation--White Supremacy, Black Power, Confederate flags or articles, Neo-Nazi or any other 'hate group'").

55. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2nd Cir. 1997). See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1986) ("The perception that the work environment is hostile can be influenced by the treatment of other persons of a plaintiff's protected class, even if that treatment is learned second-hand."); Dortz v. City of New York, 904 F. Supp. 127, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("offensive statements made . . . outside of Plaintiff's presence, may also be viewed by a factfinder as having contributed to creating a hostile environment"); Barbett v. Chelawn Services Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990):